).
Over Memorial Day weekend, Disney will release Pearl Harbor, a film granted
the largest pre-production budget ($145 million) in cinema history. The
lavish production will, no doubt, be viewed by many moviegoers as an
accurate portrayal of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Even the movie's
leading man has bought into this notion. "I really believe the film will be
the definitive piece on the attack," said actor Ben Affleck. This is
unfortunate, because the movie's producer, Jerry Bruckheimer, proclaimed in
an interview last year: "There's a book that just came out which claims
[President Franklin D.] Roosevelt knew about the attack. That's all
b***s***. He didn't know about the attack!"
But comprehensive research has not only shown Washington knew in advance of
the attack, but deliberately withheld its foreknowledge from our commanders
in Hawaii in the hope that the "surprise" attack would catapult the U.S.
into World War II. Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, stated
in 1944: "Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a
travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war."
Although FDR desired to directly involve the United States in the Second
World War, his intentions sharply contradicted his public
pronouncements. A pre-war Gallup poll showed 88 percent of Americans opposed
U.S. involvement in the European war. Citizens realized that
U.S. participation in World War I had not made a better world, and in a 1940
(election-year) speech, Roosevelt typically stated: "I have said this
before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not
going to be sent into any foreign wars."
But privately, the president planned the opposite. Roosevelt dispatched his
closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, to meet British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill in January 1941. Hopkins told Churchill: "The President is
determined that we [the United States and England] shall win the war
together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at
all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens
to him - there is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power."
William Stevenson noted in A Man Called Intrepid that American-British
military staff talks began that same month under "utmost secrecy," which, he
clarified, "meant preventing disclosure to the American public." Even Robert
Sherwood, the president's friendly biographer, said: "If the isolationists
had known the full extent of the secret alliance between the United States
and Britain, their demands for impeachment would have rumbled like thunder
throughout the land."
Background to Betrayal
Roosevelt's intentions were nearly exposed in 1940 when Tyler Kent, a code
clerk at the U.S. embassy in London, discovered secret dispatches
between Roosevelt and Churchill. These revealed that FDR - despite contrary
campaign promises - was determined to engage America in
the war. Kent smuggled some of the documents out of the embassy, hoping to
alert the American public - but was caught. With U.S.
government approval, he was tried in a secret British court and confined to
a British prison until the war's end.
During World War II's early days, the president offered numerous
provocations to Germany: freezing its assets; shipping 50 destroyers to
Britain; and depth-charging U-boats. The Germans did not retaliate, however.
They knew America's entry into World War I had shifted the balance of power
against them, and they shunned a repeat of that scenario. FDR therefore
switched his focus to Japan. Japan had signed a mutual defense pact with
Germany and Italy (the Tripartite Treaty). Roosevelt knew that if Japan went
to war with the United States, Germany and Italy would be compelled to
declare war on America - thus entangling us in the European conflict by the
back door. As Harold Ickes, secretary of the Interior, said in October 1941:
"For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would
be by way of Japan."
Much new light has been shed on Pearl Harbor through the recent work of
Robert B. Stinnett, a World War II Navy veteran. Stinnett has obtained
numerous relevant documents through the Freedom of Information Act. In Day
of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (2000), the book so
brusquely dismissed by director Bruckheimer, Stinnett reveals that
Roosevelt's plan to provoke Japan began with a memorandum from Lieutenant
Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of
Naval Intelligence. The memorandum advocated eight actions predicted to lead
Japan into attacking the United States. McCollum wrote: "If by these means
Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." FDR
enacted all eight of McCollum's provocative steps - and more.
While no one can excuse Japan's belligerence in those days, it is also true
that our government provoked that country in various ways - freezing her
assets in America; closing the Panama Canal to her shipping; progressively
halting vital exports to Japan until we finally joined Britain in an all-out
embargo; sending a hostile note to the Japanese ambassador implying military
threats if Tokyo did not alter its Pacific policies; and on, November 26th -
just 11 days before the Japanese attack - delivering an ultimatum that
demanded, as prerequisites to resumed trade, that Japan withdraw all troops
from China and Indochina, and in effect abrogate her Tripartite Treaty with
Germany and Italy.
After meeting with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1941, Secretary of War
Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: "We face the delicate question of the
diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong
and makes the first bad move - overt move." On November 25th, the day before
the ultimatum was sent to Japan's ambassadors, Stimson wrote in his diary:
"The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the
position of firing the first shot...."
The bait offered Japan was our Pacific Fleet. In 1940, Admiral J.O.
Richardson, the fleet's commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR's
decision to permanently base the fleet in Hawaii instead of its normal
berthing on the U.S. West Coast. The admiral had sound reasons: Pearl
Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any direction; it
could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to defend against
torpedo planes; and in Hawaii it would be hard to supply and train crews for
his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also lacked adequate fuel supplies and
dry docks, and keeping men far from their families would create morale
problems. The argument became heated. Said Richardson: "I came away with the
impression that, despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined
to put the United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until
he was reelected."
Richardson was quickly relieved of command. Replacing him was Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl
Harbor's deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that
Washington would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This
proved to be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing to
assault Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart in
Hawaii, General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from the
information pipeline.
Prior Knowledge
One of the most important elements in America's foreknowledge of Japan's
intentions was our government's success in cracking Japan's secret
diplomatic code known as "Purple." Tokyo used it to communicate to its
embassies and consulates, including those in Washington and Hawaii. The
code was so complex that it was enciphered and deciphered by machine. A
talented group of American cryptoanalysts broke the code in 1940 and devised
a facsimile of the Japanese machine. These, utilized by the intelligence
sections of both the War and Navy departments, swiftly revealed Japan's
diplomatic messages. The deciphered texts were nicknamed "Magic."
Copies of Magic were always promptly delivered in locked pouches to
President Roosevelt, and the secretaries of State, War, and Navy. They
also went to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and to the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. However, although three Purple
decoding machines were allotted to Britain, none were sent to Pearl Harbor.
Intercepts of ciphered messages radioed between Tokyo and its Honolulu
consulate had to be forwarded to Washington for decrypting. Thus Kimmel and
Short, the Hawaiian commanders, were at the mercy of Washington for
feedback. A request for their own decoding machine was rebuffed on the
grounds that diplomatic traffic was of
insufficient interest to soldiers.
How untrue that was! On October 9, 1941, the War Department decoded a
Tokyo-to-Honolulu dispatch instructing the Consul General to divide
Pearl Harbor into five specified areas and to report the exact locations of
American ships therein.
There is nothing unusual about spies watching ship movements - but reporting
precise whereabouts of ships in dock has only one implication. Charles
Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence later wrote that the
"reports were on a grid system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations
of American men of war . coordinate grid is the classical method for
pinpoint target designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets."
This information was never sent to Kimmel or Short.
Additional intercepts were decoded by Washington, all within one day of
their original transmission:
November 5th: Tokyo notified its Washington ambassadors that November
25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S.
November 11th: They were warned, "The situation is nearing a climax,
and the time is getting short."
November 16th: The deadline was pushed up to November 29th. "The
deadline absolutely cannot be changed," the dispatch said. "After
that, things are automatically going to happen."
November 29th (the U.S. ultimatum had now been received): The
ambassadors were told a rupture in negotiations was "inevitable," but
that Japan's leaders "do not wish you to give the impression that
negotiations are broken off."
November 30th: Tokyo ordered its Berlin embassy to inform the Germans
that "the breaking out of war may come quicker than anyone
dreams."
December 1st: The deadline was again moved ahead. "[T]o prevent the
United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been
advising the press and others that . the negotiations are continuing."
December 1st-2nd: The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations around the
world were directed to dispose of their secret documents
and all but one copy of their codes. (This was for a reason easy to fathom -
when war breaks out, the diplomatic offices of a hostile state lose their
immunity and are normally overtaken. One copy of code was retained so that
final instructions could be received, after which the last code copy would
be destroyed.)
An additional warning came via the so-called "winds" message. A November
18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations were
forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This would not be in
the Purple code, as it was intended to reach consulates and lesser agencies
of Japan not equipped with the code or one of its machines. The message, to
be repeated three times during a weather report, was "Higashi no kaze ame,"
meaning "East wind, rain." "East wind" signified the United States; "rain"
signified diplomatic split - in effect, war.
This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio monitors
were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed it up on
special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Higashi no kaze ame" was indeed
broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.
On three different occasions since 1894, Japan had made surprise attacks
coinciding with breaks in diplomatic relations. This history was not lost on
President Roosevelt. Secretary Stimson, describing FDR's White House
conference of November 25th, noted: "The President said the Japanese were
notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we might be
attacked, say next Monday, for example." Nor was it lost on Washington's
senior military officers, all of them War College graduates.
As Robert Stinnett has revealed, Washington was not only deciphering
Japanese diplomatic messages, but naval dispatches as well. President
Roosevelt had access to these intercepts via his routing officer, Lieutenant
Commander McCollum, who had authored the original eight-point plan of
provocation to Japan. So much secrecy has surrounded these naval dispatches
that their existence was not revealed during any of the ten Pearl Harbor
investigations, even the mini-probe Congress conducted in 1995. Most of
Stinnett's requests for documents concerning Pearl Harbor have been denied
as still classified, even under the Freedom of Information Act.
It was long presumed that as the Japanese fleet approached Pearl Harbor, it
maintained complete radio silence. This is untrue. The fleet barely observed
discretion, let alone silence. Naval intelligence intercepted and translated
numerous dispatches, some clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been
targeted. The most significant was the following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto
to the Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941:
The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian
waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force
of the United States fleet and deal it a mortal
blow. The first air raid is planned for the dawn of x-day. Exact date to be
given by later order.
So much official secrecy continues to surround the translations of the
intercepted Japanese naval dispatches that it is not known if the foregoing
message was sent to McCollum or seen by FDR. It is not even known who
originally translated the intercept. One thing, however, is certain: The
message's significance could not have been lost on the translator.
1941 also witnessed the following:
On January 27th, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message to
Washington stating: "The Peruvian Minister has informed a
member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese
source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the
United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack
against Pearl Harbor with all their strength...."
On November 3rd, still relying on informants, Grew notified Secretary of
State Cordell Hull: "War with the United States may come with dramatic and
dangerous suddenness." He sent an even stronger warning on November 17th.
Congressman Martin Dies would write:
Early in 1941 the Dies Committee came into possession of a strategic
map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the Japanese
to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was prepared by the
Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department. As soon as I received
the document I telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull and told him what
I had. Secretary Hull directed me not to let anyone know about the map and
stated that he would call me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In
about an hour he telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they
agreed that it would be very serious if any information concerning this map
reached the news services.... I told him it was a grave responsibility to
withhold such vital information from the public. The Secretary assured me
that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense.
Dusko Popov was a Yugoslav who worked as a double agent for both Germany and
Britain. His true allegiance was to the Allies. In the summer of 1941, the
Nazis ordered Popov to Hawaii to make a detailed study of Pearl Harbor and
its nearby airfields. The agent deduced that the mission betokened a
surprise attack by the Japanese. In August, he fully reported this to the
FBI in New York. J. Edgar Hoover later bitterly recalled that he had
provided warnings to FDR about Pearl Harbor, but that Roosevelt told him not
to pass the information any further and to just leave it in his (the
president's) hands.
Kilsoo Haan, of the Sino-Korean People's League, received definite word from
the Korean underground that the Japanese were planning to
assault Hawaii "before Christmas." In November, after getting nowhere with
the State Department, Haan convinced Iowa Senator Guy Gillette of
his claim's merit. Gillette briefed the president, who laconically thanked
him and said it would be looked into.
In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from Tokyo to
its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites including Hawaii. The
Dutch passed the information to Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S.
military observer. Thorpe sent Washington a total of four warnings. The last
went to General Marshall's intelligence chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no
further messages concerning the matter. The Dutch also had their Washington
military attaché, Colonel Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.
Captain Johann Ranneft, the Dutch naval attaché in Washington, who was
awarded the Legion of Merit for his services to America, recorded
revealing details in his diary. On December 2nd, he visited the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ranneft inquired about the Pacific. An American
officer, pointing to a wall map, said, "This is the Japanese Task Force
proceeding East." It was a spot midway between Japan and Hawaii. On December
6th, Ranneft returned and asked where the Japanese carriers were. He was
shown a position on the map about 300-400 miles
northwest of Pearl Harbor. Ranneft wrote: "I ask what is the meaning of
these carriers at this location; whereupon I receive the answer that it is
probably in connection with Japanese reports of eventual American action....
I myself do not think about it because I believe that everyone in Honolulu
is 100 percent on the alert, just like everyone here at O.N.I."
On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with
freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several
posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was one
newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies of some of
the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the Japanese were
planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let it happen. Hull made
Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped he could blow the story
sky-high in the newspapers.
Leib ran to the office of his friend Lyle Wilson, the Washington bureau
chief of United Press. While keeping his pledge to Hull, he told Wilson the
details and showed him the intercepts. Wilson replied that the story was
ludicrous and refused to run it. Through connections, Leib managed to get a
hurried version onto UP's foreign cable, but only one newspaper carried any
part of it.
After Pearl Harbor, Lyle Wilson called Leib to his office. He handed him a
copy of FDR's just-released "day of infamy" speech. The two men
wept. Leib recounted his story in the recent History Channel documentary,
"Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor."
The foregoing represents just a sampling of evidence that Washington knew in
advance of the Pearl Harbor attack. For additional evidences,
see Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian John Toland, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl
Harbor by Robert Stinnett.* So certain was the data that, at a private press
briefing in November 1941, General George Marshall confidently predicted
that a Japanese-American war would break out during the "first ten days of
December."
However, none of this information was passed to our commanders in Hawaii,
Kimmel and Short, with the exception of Ambassador Grew's
January warning, a copy of which reached Kimmel on February 1st. To allay
any concerns, Lieutenant Commander McCollum - who originated
the plan to incite Japan to war - wrote Kimmel: "Naval Intelligence places
no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data
regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese naval and army
forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or
planned for in the foreseeable future."
Sitting Ducks
To ensure a successful Japanese attack - one that would enrage America into
joining the war - it was vital to keep Kimmel and Short out of
the intelligence loop. However, Washington did far more than this to
facilitate the Japanese assault.
On November 25th, approximately one hour after the Japanese attack force
left port for Hawaii, the U.S. Navy issued an order forbidding U.S. and
Allied shipping to travel via the North Pacific. All transpacific shipping
was rerouted through the South Pacific. This order was even applied to
Russian ships docked on the American west coast. The purpose is easy to
fathom. If any commercial ship accidentally stumbled on the Japanese task
force, it might alert Pearl Harbor. As Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the
Navy's War Plans officer in 1941, frankly stated: "We were prepared to
divert traffic when we believed war was imminent. We sent the traffic down
via the Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be
clear of any traffic."
The Hawaiian commanders have traditionally been censured for failing to
detect the approaching Japanese carriers. What goes unsaid is that
Washington denied them the means to do so. An army marching overland toward
a target is easily spotted. But Hawaii is in the middle of the
ocean. Its approaches are limitless and uninhabited. During the week before
December 7th, naval aircraft searched more than two million
square miles of the Pacific - but never saw the Japanese force. This is
because Kimmel and Short had only enough planes to survey one-third
of the 360-degree arc around them, and intelligence had advised
(incorrectly) that they should concentrate on the Southwest.
Radar, too, was insufficient. There were not enough trained surveillance
pilots. Many of the reconnaissance craft were old and suffered from a lack
of spare parts. The commanders' repeated requests to Washington for
additional patrol planes were turned down. Rear Admiral Edward T. Layton,
who served at Pearl Harbor, summed it up in his book And I Was There: "There
was never any hint in any intelligence received by the local command of any
Japanese threat to Hawaii. Our air defenses were stripped on orders from the
army chief himself. Of the twelve B-17s on the island, only six could be
kept in the air by cannibalizing the others for spare parts."
The Navy has traditionally followed the rule that, when international
relations are critical, the fleet puts to sea. That is exactly what Admiral
Kimmel did. Aware that U.S.-Japanese relations were deteriorating, he sent
46 warships safely into the North Pacific in late November 1941 - without
notifying Washington. He even ordered the fleet to conduct a mock air raid
on Pearl Harbor, clairvoyantly selecting the same launch site Admiral
Yamamoto chose two weeks later.
When the White House learned of Kimmel's move it countermanded his orders
and ordered all ships returned to dock, using the dubious excuse that
Kimmel's action might provoke the Japanese. Washington knew that if the two
fleets met at sea, and engaged each other, there might be questions about
who fired the first shot.
Kimmel did not give up, however. With the exercise canceled, his carrier
chief, Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, issued plans for a 25-ship task
force to guard against an "enemy air and submarine attack" on Pearl Harbor.
The plan never went into effect. On November 26th, Admiral Stark,
Washington's Chief of Naval Operations, ordered Halsey to use his carriers
to transport fighter planes to Wake and Midway islands - further depleting
Pearl Harbor's air defenses.
It was clear, of course, that once disaster struck Pearl Harbor, there would
be demands for accountability. Washington seemed to artfully take this into
account by sending an ambiguous "war warning" to Kimmel, and a similar one
to Short, on November 27th. This has been used for years by Washington
apologists to allege that the commanders should have been ready for the
Japanese.
Indeed, the message began conspicuously: "This dispatch is to be considered
a war warning." But it went on to state: "The number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organizations of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai or Kra
Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." None of these areas were closer than 5,000
miles to Hawaii! No threat to Pearl Harbor was hinted at. It ended with the
words: "Continental districts, Guam, Samoa take measures against sabotage."
The message further stated that "measures should be carried out so as not
repeat not to alarm civil population." Both commanders reported the actions
taken to Washington. Short followed through with sabotage precautions,
bunching his planes together (which hinders saboteurs but makes ideal
targets for bombers), and Kimmel stepped up air surveillance and sub
searches. If their response to the "war warning" was insufficient,
Washington said nothing. The next day, a follow-up message from Marshall's
adjutant general to Short warned only: "Initiate forthwith all additional
measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments,
property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel
against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against
espionage."
Thus things stood as Japan prepared to strike. Using the Purple code, Tokyo
sent a formal statement to its Washington ambassadors. It was to
be conveyed to the American Secretary of State on Sunday, December 7th. The
statement terminated relations and was tantamount to a
declaration of war. On December 6th, in Washington, the War and Navy
departments had already decrypted the first 13 parts of this 14-part
message. Although the final passage officially severing ties had not yet
come through, the fiery wording made its meaning obvious. Later that day,
when Lieutenant Lester Schulz delivered to President Roosevelt his copy of
the intercept, Schulz heard FDR say to his advisor, Harry Hopkins, "This
means war."
During subsequent Pearl Harbor investigations, both General Marshall, Army
Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations,
denied any recollection of where they had been on the evening of December
6th - despite Marshall's reputation for a photographic memory. But James G.
Stahlman, a close friend of Navy Secretary Frank Knox, said Knox told him
FDR convened a high-level meeting at the White House that evening. Knox,
Marshall, Stark, and War Secretary Stimson attended. Indeed, with the nation
on war's threshold, such a conference only made sense. That same evening,
the Navy Department received a request from Stimson for a list of the
whereabouts of all ships in the Pacific.
On the morning of December 7th, the final portion of Japan's lengthy message
to the U.S. government was decoded. Tokyo added two special
directives to its ambassadors. The first directive, which the message called
"very important," was to deliver the statement at 1 p.m. The second
directive ordered that the last copy of code, and the machine that went with
it, be destroyed. The gravity of this was immediately recognized in the Navy
Department: Japan had a long history of synchronizing attacks with breaks in
relations; Sunday was an abnormal day to deliver diplomatic messages - but
the best for trying to catch U.S. armed forces at low vigilance; and 1 p.m.
in Washington was shortly after dawn in Hawaii!
Admiral Stark arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m. He was shown the message
and the important delivery time. One junior officer pointed out the
possibility of an attack on Hawaii; another urged that Kimmel be notified.
But Stark refused; he did nothing all morning. Years later, he told the
press that his conscience was clear concerning Pearl Harbor because all his
actions had been dictated by a "higher authority." As Chief of Naval
Operations, Stark had only one higher authority: Roosevelt.