ARTICLE ON OPEC SUMMIT by Steve Ellner
Part 1
At OPEC's Second Summit on September 27-28, member nations blamed high oil
prices on taxes, middlemen and bottlenecks, in that order. What they did not
say was that changes within OPEC itself also have much to do with the price
increases. As in the past, the militant Moslem nations -- Iran, Iraq and
Lybia - which favor keeping production down and prices higher, are pitted
against the pro-U.S. Saudi Arabia. Venezuela represents the big change. When
President Hugo Chávez took office in February 1999, Venezuela went from
being OPEC's most notorious violator of the organization's assigned quotas
to its most disciplined member, after which other oil exporters followed
suit.
Chávez's activist role has thrust Venezuela into a leadership position in
OPEC. His initiative in calling for the summit, his promotion of the "band
system" in which prices are allowed to oscillate between $22 and $28, and
his insistence on including the problem of the foreign debt in the meeting's
closing document have helped convert him into a third-world paladin. The
Parisian daily, Le Monde, wrote that the Venezuelan leader has passed from
being an advocate of "a peaceful revolution against his nation's oligarchy
and corrupt political class to the main spokesman for an offensive - this
time at the planetary level -- against savage globalization."
The summit held in Caracas, unlike OPEC's regular meetings which deal
exclusively with oil prices, was designed to answer charges against the
organization and shore up its image. Since early 1999, average oil prices
have increased from $10 to $30 a barrel, laying the organization open to
charges of manipulating the market.
Other ingredients in the world-wide oil crisis are also relatively new. The
three previous oil shocks of 1973-74, 1979-81 and 1990-91 were about armed
conflict and religious and nationalistic fanaticism: the Yom Kippur War, the
Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Persian Gulf War. In contrast, the sharp
increases in oil prices over the last year and a half reflect the inherent
instability of the global economy. OPEC's effort to achieve stable prices
can thus be seen as a response to global capitalism's disruptive tendencies.
OPEC's founding document in 1960 called for stable prices as a corrective to
a depressed market, but now the organization recognizes that this objective
can work two ways. It can mean driving prices up or down by increasing or
decreasing production. OPEC president Alí Rodríguez of Venezuela pointed out
that the organization "has matured enough to avoid past errors when prices
were allowed to skyrocket and then plunged."
In an effort to enlist international cooperation for the goal of stable
prices, OPEC members drafted the "Declaration of Caracas," which calls for
"channels of communication between oil producing and consuming nations to
achieve market stability." The declaration also urges "developed nations to
recognize that the greatest environmental tragedy confronting the world is
human poverty."
In order to make the proposed dialogue a reality, OPEC nations will be
meeting with oil importing ones in Saudi Arabia on November 17-19.
Venezuela's
Vice-Chancellor Jorge Valero told In These Times that unlike previous
meetings
of its kind this one will involve people with decision-making power. "In the
past, the developed countries sent technicians and the ministers stayed
home."
These concrete efforts enhance OPEC's credibility and make the term "just
price" seem more than a hypocritical, face-saving slogan. Speaking at the
summit, Chávez attempted to mock the notion that crude oil prices are
currently exorbitant. Amidst the laughter of several otherwise stoical
looking Iranian delegates, Chávez pointed out that a barrel of Coca Cola was
303% more than that of oil, and he then went on to read off the prices of a
barrel of suntan lotion, shampoo, high-quality wine and other commodities.
Chávez questioned the decision of the Clinton governent to sell oil
reserves, created to protect U.S. strategic interests, in order to force
prices down. Chávez, an army officer who likes to draw parallels between
military and political strategy, remarked "In the science of war, you use
reserves only in extreme circumstances."
Turning to Europe, Chávez provided statistics showing that taxes throughout
the continent (which are considerably higher than in the U.S.) contribute
more to prices at the gas pump than crude oil. England, where taxes account
for 80 percent of the price of gasoline, tops the list.
Amazingly, OPEC's argument is widely accepted in Europe, as militant
protests against fuel prices throughout the continent were directed mainly
at respective governments. This reaction represents a far cry from general
sentiment in the 1970s when angry demonstrators burnt posters of Arab
sheiks. That OPEC production has declined from over 50% of the world's
output to less than 40% makes it less vulnerable to accusations of
constituting a monopolistic "cartel."
Nigerian delegate Emmanuel Diya pointed out that "in effect, OPEC is telling
the developing countries 'look, we are willing to cooperate in reducing
prices, but we expect you to reduce taxes.'"
OPEC spokesmen at the summit also targeted middlemen who sign contracts for
sales in the future, a practice which also drives prices up. These traders
make money off fears - both well founded and unfounded -- of future
shortages. According to Venezuelan oil expert Mazhar Al Shereidah, the
psychological factor related to the market, which these traders exploit,
adds about $6 on to each barrel.
OPEC spokesmen denied that oil exporting nations are undersupplying the
market, and instead attributed shortages to bottlenecks between points of
production and consumption. No new refineries, for instance, have been built
in the U.S. in the last twenty years, and those in existence now operate at
98% capacity. The minimization of inventories in order not to tie capital up
also produces occasional bottlenecks. Such "rationalization" (known in the
industry as KILL - "keep inventories low and lean") is a byproduct of recent
mergers of such giants as Exxon and Mobile, as well as British Petroleum and
Amoco.
Chávez's adversaries at home argue that the Second Summit was a mere
repetition of the first one held in 1975, and that the organization has
not advanced at all in twenty-five years. Thus they claim that Chávez's
proposal to establish an OPEC bank as a substitute to the IMF for poorer
nations is a mere embellishment of the "OPEC Fund," created at the First
Summit. If none of the proposals of the "Declaration of Caracas" come to
fruition and oil prices continue to fluctuate widely, Chávez may want to
apply to OPEC what he announced on his return from the UN's Millenium Summit
in New York in September. On that occasion he swore he would not attend
another UN meeting if nothing came of the ambitious proposals to eradicate
extreme poverty that the conference had just agreed upon.
Nevertheless, that the Second Summit takes OPEC to where it was in 1975
is not entirely negative. It was that meeting which got the
"North-South" dialogue off the ground. At the time OPEC was a
trailblazer, as third-world exporters of other raw materials and
agricultural commodities emulated the oil exporting organization. In the
1980s, however, with U.S. political and economic supremacy no longer in
dispute, the third-world movement petered out. If the movement is now
revitalized, it will have the advantage of not being caught in the Cold
War crossfire of two superpowers. It will also be in a position to link
up to the popular campaign to check globalization's inhumane and
disruptive features. Thus the implications of what Chávez calls the
"relaunching of OPEC," goes far beyond oil prices, and is of vital
significance for developed and developing nations alike.
Steve Ellner has published extensively on Latin American politics. He is a
frequent contributor to "In These Times."
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